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Enforcing the Equator Principles: An NGO’s 
Principled Effort to Stop the Financing of a Paper 
Pulp Mill in Uruguay 
Vivian Lee∗  
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 Traditionally, nation-states have played a central, if not exclusive, role in the 
human rights system.1  Critical to the functioning of the human rights system has been the 
act of binding states through a network of treaty obligations to which only states could 
become parties.2  This traditional model of human rights obligations has in recent years 
come under increased pressure from a changing, globalizing world.  Greater attention is 
now being paid to the role and responsibilities of non-state actors, such as individuals and 
corporations, vis-à-vis human rights.3  
¶2 A new, modernized human rights system is developing in which the non-state actor 
has abandoned its marginal role and is growing in prominence.  Moreover, one of the 
newer concepts in this modernized system is the notion of corporate human rights 
responsibility for both state and non-state actors.  In recent years, state actors have been 
found to have violated articles of human rights conventions for failing to stop the 
activities of non-state corporate actors.  For example, in the case of López Ostra v. Spain, 
the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) found that Spain had violated Article 8 
of the European Convention of Human Rights because the state failed to stop the 
activities of a waste-treatment plant whose operations caused nuisance and health 
problems for nearby inhabitants.4  In its decision, the court formally recognized that 
environmental degradation can obstruct one’s enjoyment of human rights.5  The decision 
demonstrated the court’s willingness to address corporate human rights violations, even if 
it must do so through a state actor.  
¶3 Another feature of this new, modernized human rights system has to do with the 
recognition that the reach of human rights continues to expand to encompass social and 
environmental rights, making a discussion of such rights particularly relevant in the area 
of corporate human rights responsibility.  The decision in López Ostra v. Spain6 
                                                 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2009, Northwestern University School of Law.  B.A. cum laude in History, Yale College, 
2003.  Sincere thanks to the current Board members of the Journal of International Human Rights here at 
Northwestern who were instrumental in shaping the final stages of this work and to my 3L advisor who did 
the same for the earlier ones.  I would also like to thank my parents, my sister, my brother-in-law, and my 
friends for their love and support.  
1 INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT : LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 1385 (Henry J. Steiner et al. eds., 
Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2008)(1996)[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT ]. 
2 Id.  
3 Id.  
4 López Ostra v. Spain, 303-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 16-17 (1994). 
5 Judith Hippler Bello & Richard Desgagne, Lopez Ostra v. Spain, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 788, 789 (1995).  
6 López Ostra, supra note 4.  
Vol. 6:2] Vivian Lee 
355 
exemplifies the expanded reach of human rights through the recognition that social and 
environmental conditions such as noise and pollution are within the ambit of a person’s 
rights protected by Article 8 of the European Convention. 7  The López Ostra opinion 
clearly recognized the connection between environmental conditions and human rights in 
stating that “severe environmental pollution may affect individuals’ well-being and 
prevent them from enjoying their homes in such a way as to affect their private and 
family life adversely, without, however, seriously endangering their health.”8  The court’s 
later decisions confirmed the position that the court considers the creation of certain 
social and environmental conditions as possible human rights violations.9 
¶4 Within the non-state actor world, the winds of change have led private entities such 
as corporations and financial institutions to begin expressing a sense of responsibility for 
sustainable development and responsible lending practices.  To this end, private actors 
have chosen to engage mainly in voluntary, non-enforceable commitments such as 
guidelines and principles.10  Such non-enforceable commitments and guidelines have the 
advantage of sending a strong, public message to the world of a corporation’s policy 
concerning responsible development, while stopping short of providing enforceable legal 
liability.  Concurrently, individuals and NGOs have led attempts to hold such private 
entities accountable for violations of environmental laws and human rights based on their 
voluntary commitments.11  
¶5 Voluntary commitments allow individuals and NGOs to try to affect change in two 
main ways.  First, individuals and NGOs can publicly pressure private actors to comply 
with their own voluntarily, publicly-expressed commitments to human rights, sustainable 
development or environmental responsibility.  Second, if the voluntary commitments 
themselves provide such recourse, individuals and NGOs can file a complaint with a 
formal adjudicatory venue.  Pressuring private entities to enforce the voluntary 
commitments allows individuals and NGOs to circumvent the sometimes difficult issues 
of standing and justic iability which typically restrict the range of actors and subject 
matters that can be adjudicated in both domestic and international courts.  Moreover, 
                                                 
7 The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 8, Nov. 4, 1980, 213 
U.N.T.S. 222.  
Article 8  
1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in 
accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or 
the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, 
or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
Id. 
8 López Ostra, supra note 4. 
9 Hatton v. United Kingdom, 36022/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 107 (2001) (holding that the United Kingdom 
violated Article 8 in failing to strike a fair balance between the state’s regulation of Heathrow Airport 
aircraft noise levels and the applicants’ effective enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and 
their private and family lives); see also Hatton v. United Kingdom, 36022/97 Eur. Ct. H.R. § 96 (2003) 
(reversing the 2001 decision, but nonetheless recognizing that “where an individual is directly and seriously 
affected by noise or other pollution, an issue may arise under Article 8.”); see also Guerra v. Italy, 1998-I 
Eur. Ct. H.R. § 57 (1998) (observing that “[t]he direct effect of the toxic emissions on the applicants’ right 
to respect for their private and family life means that Article 8 is applicable.”).  
10 See generally HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT , supra note 1, at 1396-98, 1402-03.  
11 Michael K. Lee, The Uruguay Paper Pulp Mill Dispute: Highlighting the Growing Importance of NGOs 
and Public Protest in the Enforcement of International Environmental Law, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 71, 71 (2006). 
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avoiding the court system allows individuals and NGOs to effectuate change while 
avoiding the often lengthy and time-consuming court procedures.  As opportunities for 
enforcing voluntary commitments grow, individuals’ and NGOs’ efforts to hold private 
entities accountable will play an increasingly important role in enforcing human rights 
law. 12  
¶6 The story of an Argentine NGO that failed to stop the financing of a paper pulp 
mill in Uruguay identifies the avenues open to individuals and NGOs to hold Equator 
Principles signatories accountable.  The Equator Principles are a set of voluntary 
commitments that ten private financial institutions adopted on June 4, 2003.13  The 
Principles reflect a commitment to, and increasing preoccupation with, responsible 
lending practices, with particular regard to social and environmental issues.14  The ten 
pioneering financial institutions have called themselves the Equator Principles Financial 
Institutions (“EPFI”).15  After only three years, the original ten EPFIs were joined by 
another thirty who, together, are responsible for over 80% of the world’s project 
finance.16  
¶7 This note will focus on the Center for Human Rights and Environment’s 
(“CEDHA”) 17 efforts to use the Equator Principles to stop the financing and construction 
of the Orion paper-pulp mill by the Finnish company Metsa-Botnia18 in neighboring 
Uruguay.  The Equator Princ iples were only one basis for a larger campaign to impute 
corporate human rights responsibility and to stop the construction of the pulp mill.  
CEDHA alleged violations of international human rights and international environmental 
law, violations of international bilateral law, violations of the International Finance 
Corporation Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies (“IFC Safeguards”),19 
                                                 
12 Id. at 73.  
13 The “Equator Principles”: A Financial Industry Benchmark for Determining, Assessing and Managing 
Social & Environmental Risk in Project Financing (July 2006), available at  http://www.equator-
principles.com/documents/Equator_Principles.pdf [hereinafter The Equator Principles].   
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Paul Q. Watchman, Banking on Responsibility, A.L.I. 385, 398 (2006). 
17 The Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, CEDHA, is an Argentinean non-profit organization that 
aims to build a more harmonious relationship between the environment and people.  Its work centers on 
promoting greater access to justice and guaranteeing human rights for victims of environmental 
degradation, non-sustainable management of natural resources.  See CEDHA, General Information about 
CEDHA, http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/general_information/ (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).  
18 The forest industry company Oy Metsä-Botnia Ab - marketing name Botnia - was founded in 1973. It 
manufactures high quality bleached pulp grades under the name Botnia.  Botnia is owned by M-real Oyj, 
Metsäliitto Osuuskunta, and UPM-Kymmene Oyj. See Metsa-Botnia, Our Company, 
http://www.botnia.com/en/default.asp?path=204,208 (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).  
19 The International Finance Corporation is a member of the World Bank Group.  It provides loans, equity, 
structured finance and risk management products, and advisory services to build the private sector in 
developing countries. See International Finance Corporation, About IFC, http://www.ifc.org/about (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2008).  The IFC Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies contain three prongs: first, a 
Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability which defines the IFC’s role and responsibility in 
supporting project performance in partnership with client; second, a Disclosure Policy which defines the 
IFC’s obligations to disclose information about itself as an institution and its activities; third, an 
Environmental and Social Review Procedure which gives direction to IFC officers in implementing the 
Policy on Social and Environmental Sustainability and reviewing compliance and implementation by 
private sector projects. See International Finance Corporation, Environmental and Social Standards,  
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/enviro.nsf/Content/EnvSocStandards (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).  
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violations of IFC Disclosure Policy, violations of national and regional laws in Uruguay 
and Argentina, and finally, violations of the Equator Principles.20 
¶8 Although the Orion project’s financing institution was an EPFI, CEDHA found 
nothing in the text of the Equator Principles to hold the EPFI liable for a violation of the 
Principles.21  The Principles do not establish a mechanism for self-enforcement, as they 
were conceived as a set of voluntary guidelines.22  Instead, their adoption is seen as a 
commitment to the development of internal policies and practices.23  As discussed infra, 
Principle 6 establishes a Grievance Mechanism through which an NGO can reach the 
borrower, but not the EPFI.24  The Disclaimer section of the Principles also makes clear 
that the Principles do not create any rights or liabilities.25  
¶9 Nevertheless, the voluntary principles did play an important role in CEDHA’s 
campaign.  First, it allowed the NGO to shame and expose the EPFIs to public scrutiny.  
Crucial to this campaign were charges of non-compliance with the Equator Principles 
sent directly to the EPFIs.  CEDHA’s public shaming campaign was instrumental in 
forcing the withdrawal of the first EPFI, ING Group, from the project.  The campaign, 
however, did not persuade the second EPFI, Calyon, to withdraw.  Second, since the 
Principles tie the EPFIs to compliance with IFC Safeguards, the voluntary commitment 
gave CEDHA the opportunity to challenge the project’s compliance with IFC Safeguards 
through a formal complaint with the Compliance Advisory Ombudsman (“CAO”), the 
independent recourse mechanism for the IFC.  In response to the CEDHA complaint, the 
CAO reviewed the compliance of the Orion project with IFC Safeguards and issued a 
report which focused on and found several procedural deficiencies, which the IFC 
remedied easily.26  Once the IFC concluded that the project conformed to its own 
environmental and social policies, Calyon, the second EPFI involved in the project, was 
assured that the project did not violate the provisions of the Equator Principles.27  The end 
result of this formal complaint was mere procedural compliance with the disclosure 
schedules established by the IFC Safeguards.  This outcome shows that while the 
Principles offer NGOs access to a formal adjudicatory venue, the findings of this venue 
may not help the NGO achieve its final goal of stopping the construction of the paper 
pulp mill.  
¶10 The story of the Orion project makes clear that individuals and NGOs cannot rely 
entirely on the Equator Principles to impose liability on EPFIs.  The voluntary nature of 
the Principles itself effectively means that the reach of the Principles depends on a given 
EPFI’s conscience, unless those trying to force compliance are able to mount a public 
shaming campaign of such magnitude as to force the EPFI to comply.  Moreover, if the 
                                                 
20 Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, Compliance Complaint Regarding Proposed Pulp Paper Mill Investment 
in Fray Bentos Uruguay (May 18, 2006), available at  
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/compliance-complaint-calyon.pdf.  
21 Id.; see also The Equator Principles, supra  note 13, at 5.   
22 See The Equator Principles, supra  note 13, at 5.  
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 4.  
25 Id. at 5.  
26 COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT REPORT : COMPLAINT REGARDING 
IFC’S PROPOSED INVESTMENT IN CELULOSAS DE M’BOPICUÁ AND ORION PROJECTS, URUGUAY (2005), 
available at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/html -english/documents/preliminary_assessmentFINAL.pdf 
[hereinafter CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT ]. 
27 Id.  
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EPFI claims and the IFC finds that the project does comply with IFC Safeguards, 
procedural compliance alone may still be insufficient to ensure that private financial 
institutions are financing projects less likely to cause social and environmental harm.  
Where, as here, procedural compliance was insufficient, the Principles nevertheless 
remain a stepping-stone to a future mechanism of more substantial, if not binding, 
commitments by financial non-state actors to responsible investing. 
¶11 Despite their shortcomings, voluntary commitments create a forum in which 
interested non-state actors -- individuals, NGOs and corporations -- may participate 
actively in the development of corporate human rights responsibilities.  CEDHA’s 
campaign was a strong testament to the crucial role NGOs play and will continue to play 
in the area of corporate human rights responsibility, especially in ensuring that non-state 
actors abide by their voluntary commitments and guidelines.  Created as a result of 
voluntary commitments, the Equator Principles also invite corporations to develop and 
improve their own position on sustainable development.  It is in this sense that the 
development and continued existence of voluntary commitments are not only crucial for 
the potential of NGO public shaming campaigns and access to formal adjudicatory 
venues, but are also an invaluable contribution to the corporate responsibility movement. 
II. THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 
¶12 Ten private financial institutions adopted the Equator Principles on June 4, 2003, 
committing themselves to sustainable development and responsible investment.28  For 
projects whose costs exceed $50 million, and are thus more likely to affect social and 
environmental conditions, the financial institutions have agreed to invest only in those 
projects that comply with IFC Safeguards.29  The Preamble notes that the purpose of the 
Principles is “to ensure that the projects we finance are developed in a manner that is 
socially responsible and reflect sound environmental management practices.”30  Sixty 
signatories are currently committed to the Principles.31  Also, it is noteworthy that the 
project finance threshold has recently been lowered from $50 million to $10 million. 32  
This threshold shift means that the Principles can reach a greater number of projects that 
can potentially cause social and environmental damage.33  
¶13 The Equator Principles’ Preamble establishes that the nine principles are intended 
to serve as a common baseline and framework for the implementation by the EPFI of its 
own internal social and environmental policies.34  The EPFI pledges not to “provide loans 
to projects where the borrower will not or is unable to comply with our respective social 
and environmental policies and procedures that implement the Equator Principles.”35  The 
Preamble recognizes the pivotal role that project finance plays in financing deve lopment 
                                                 
28 The Equator Principles, supra  note 13, at 2. 
29 Id.  
30 Id. at 1.  
31 The Equator Principles, The Equator Principles, available at http://www.equator-principles.com (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2008).  
32 The Equator Principles, supra  note 13, at 2.  The lower threshold “ensure[s] that all significant and 
sensitive projects [are] covered by the Equator Principles.” The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked 
Questions, FAQ n. 7, available at http://www.equator-principles.com/faq.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2008).  
33 The Equator Principles, supra  note 13, at 2. 
34 Id. at 1. 
35 Id.  
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throughout the world and the potential that project financiers will encounter complex 
social and environmental issues, especially in projects in emerging markets.36   
¶14 Despite their stated goals, there is disagreement as to the real impact of the Equator 
Principles.  The critics emphasize the shortcomings that remain in the substance of the 
Principles.37  They point to the fact that the Principles are pegged to the IFC Standards, 
but not to the broader sustainability policies underlying these standards.38  Many argue 
that the Principles should be pegged to a set of standards that reflects a more effective or 
more far-reaching sustainability policy.  Proponents of the current Principles, however, 
stand firmly behind the proposition that independent of the motivation driving the 
decision to join, the Equator Principles have committed prominent private sector entities 
to an active role in the area of responsible and sustainable development and have 
arguably strengthened the public’s ability to hold the financial sector accountable for its 
actions.39  More importantly, there are claims that the Equator Principles have created a 
“virtuous circle” where mature sponsors are designing more robust projects to comply 
with the Principles.  EPFIs have also required non-Equator banks to comply with the 
Principles in the administration of the project financing as a pre-condition for a facility 
arranged by the EPFI.40  A survey of the Equator Principles, conducted by a partner at the 
law firm of Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (“Freshfields”), suggests that the Principles 
have contributed to the creation of a common framework and language for the project 
finance industry based on an external and respected benchmark, the IFC Safeguards.41  
The common framework and language are hailed as a step forward in providing the 
momentum to propel “other areas of environmental and social responsibility in the 
financial industry.”42  
III. THE ORION PROJECT CONTROVERSY 
¶15 In 2005, the Uruguayan government enthusiastically welcomed the Orion paper 
pulp mill project as part of the largest capital investment in Uruguay’s history. 43  Not only 
was the size of the investment unprecedented, it also followed a deep economic recession 
that ensued from the collapse of Argentina’s economy in 2001.44  The investment sought 
the construction of two paper pulp mills -- the Orion pulp mill and a second mill to be 
built by Spain’s ENCE -- whose total investment was valued at ten percent of the 
                                                 
36 Id.  
37 Bracken: Few Signs of Equator Principles’ Success – The Equator Principles Have Been Improved But 
Successful Implementation Remains the True Litmus Test, Say Andrea Durbin and Johan Frijns, THE 
BANKER, Aug. 1, 2006. 
38 Id.  Examples of more effective or more far-reaching sustainability policies include requirements of the 
IFC that fall outside the IFC performance standards such as the requirement on revenue and contract 
transparency for extractive industries, as well as international standards and best practice in areas such as 
human rights and climate change.  
39 Andrew Hardenbrook, The Equator Principles: The Private Financial Sector’s Attempt at Environmental 
Responsibility, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 197, 197 (2007). 
40 Watchman, supra  note 16, at 389.  
41 Id.; see also  Watchman, supra note 16.  
42 The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions, FAQ n. 3, supra  note 32. 
43 Monte Reel, An Economic Boon in Uruguay Becomes a Bane to Argentina: Planned Paper Mills Bring 
Promise of Jobs, but Also Fears of Pollution, WASH. POST , Nov. 13, 2005, at A22. 
44 Id. 
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country’s gross domestic product.45  The investment was expected to have a significant 
impact on Uruguay by increasing its GDP by $350 million (two percent) per year.46  The 
plant would provide direct employment for 300 people and indirect employment for 
another 2,200 people.47 
¶16 Neighboring Argentina, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic about a project that 
would potentially pollute the River Uruguay that both countries share and that would 
bring no financial benefits to Argentina.48  As Argentina mounted its objections, some 
commentators in the media viewed the issue as a political objection reflecting another 
regional row between Argentina and Uruguay. 49  Others saw it as organized resistance to 
the wave of European corporations shifting their operations to poorer nations after 
tougher European environmental controls over pulp production took hold.50  Jorge Pedro 
Busti, Governor of Entre Ríos, the city in Uruguay which expected to be most affected by 
the pulp mill, expressed the view that European corporations were taking advantage of 
laxer regulations and politicians who are more easily intimidated.51  He said, “[t]hese 
companies that nobody wants in Europe just want to come to the Third World and use us 
as their guinea pig.”52  Jorge Daniel Taillant of CEDHA echoed the sentiment: “This is 
something that’s been going on for several decades now – the idea of transferring paper 
mill industries to the global south.  They are moving these companies south to places like 
Uruguay where they have less strict environmental laws.”53 
¶17 While Argentina took on its own fight in the international human rights arena as a 
state actor, CEDHA tried to stop the financing and construction of the Orion paper pulp 
mill in neighboring Uruguay through the Equator Principles.54  Specifically, CEDHA 
sought to hold two EPFIs, ING Group and Calyon, accountable for violations of the 
Equator Principles.55  The NGO sent compliance complaints directly to the EPFIs to test 
the reach of the Principles.56  The complaints denounced the EPFIs for having violated 
the Principles by agreeing to finance a project that did not comply with the Principles’ 
guidelines.57  Among other things, the complaint focused on the project’s deficient 
Environmental Assessment and a lack of measurements of cumulative impacts the project 
would have on the environment surrounding the site of the mill.58  According to the 
complaint, the site chosen for the construction of the mill was extremely rich in natural 
                                                 
45 Id.  
46 US Votes in Favor of International Loan for Uruguay Pulpmill Project, US FED. NEWS, Nov. 21, 2006. 
47 Id.  
48 Ian Black, Unity Proves Paper Thin, GUARDIAN, Mar. 17, 2006, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2006/mar/17/businesscomment.worlddispatch.  
49 Id. 
50 Emad Mekay, ARGENTINA/URUGUAY: Paper Plant Row Extends to French Bank ,  
http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=33324.  
51 Id.  
52 Id.  
53 Id.  
54 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, Compliance Complaint Regarding Proposed Pulp Paper Mill 
Investment in Fray Bentos Uruguay (Apr. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/complaint-letter-to-ing-eng.pdf. 
55 Id; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 20. 
56 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 
20. 
57 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.  
58 Id.  
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resources and heavily reliant on tourism and fisheries for local livelihood.59  Not only 
would the pulp mill harm such industries, but it would also present “a serious risk to the 
health of local communities.”60  Further, the complaint stated that the site was 
“immediately above the potable water intake for the local community of Fray Bentos” 
and in “very close proximity to important tourist locations.”61  
¶18 CEDHA’s, and to a certain extent Argentina’s, main objection to the construction 
and operation of the pulp mills was based on environmental damage to the River Uruguay 
and the surrounding areas.62  Both CEDHA and the Argentine government faced the main 
challenge of determining ways to use enforceability mechanisms to address these 
environmental concerns.  Since voluntary principles like the Equator Principles do not 
create an enforcement mechanism, CEDHA relied mainly on a public shaming campaign 
-- conducted through compliance letters sent directly to the EPFIs -- and on recourse to a 
formal adjudicatory venue through the World Bank’s IFC’s dispute resolution 
mechanism, the CAO.63  However, the CAO proceeding, while more formal than the 
compliance complaints sent to the EPFIs, resulted in mere procedural compliance.64  
Despite their efforts to enforce the Equator Principles, CEDHA was unable to stop the 
construction of the mill.65  Mesa-Botnia completed the construction and installation of 
Orion on schedule and the mill has been in operation since September 11, 2007.66   
IV.  THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES’ GRIEVANCE MECHANISM 
¶19 The Equator Principles provide a grievance mechanism for individuals or groups 
from project-affected communities to hold borrowers accountable.  However, the Equator 
Principles do not contain a provision that directly connects the financial institution to 
those who were or will be directly harmed by the environmental implications of a project.  
Principle 6 establishes a Grievance Mechanism67 that gives people from among project-
                                                 
59 Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 20.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Mekay, supra note 50.  In particular, there was concern about toxic runoffs and the chemical stench of 
rotten eggs which could affect both the agricultural and tourist industries in the region.  There was also 
concern that potentially carcinogenic chemicals in the runoff would be a public health hazard for those 
living along the riverbanks. See Reel, supra  note 48.  
63 COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN, FINAL REPORT : CAO AUDIT OF IFC’S AND MIGA’S DUE 
DILIGENCE FOR TWO PULP MILLS IN URUGUAY (2006), available at  
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/cao-final-audit-report-eng.pdf [hereinafter CAO, 
FINAL REPORT ]. 
64 CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26. 
65 Press Release, Metsa-Botnia, The start-up process of Botnia in Fray Bentos begins today (Nov. 12, 
2007), http://www.botnia.com/en/default.asp?path=204;210;211;1606;1927. 
66 Id.  
67 The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 4.  
Principle 6: Grievance Mechanism.  For all Category A and, as appropriate, Category B projects located in non-
OECD countries, and those located in OECD countries not designated as High-Income, as defined by the World Bank 
Development Indicators Database, to ensure that consultation, disclosure and community engagement continues 
throughout construction and operation of the project, the borrower will, scaled to the risks and adverse impacts of the 
project, establish a grievance mechanism as part of the management system.  This will allow the borrower to receive 
and facilitate resolution of concerns and grievances about the project’s social and environmental performance raised by 
individuals or groups from among project-affected communities.  The borrower will inform the affected communities 
about the mechanism in the course of its community engagement process and ensure that the mechanism addresses 
concerns promptly and transparently, in a culturally appropriate manner, and is readily accessible to all segments of the 
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affected communities and NGOs access only to the borrower (in this case, Finnish Metsa-
Botnia), for “concerns and grievances about the project’s social and environmental 
performance.”68  Even in the event that an individual or group reached out to the 
borrower, the borrower is not bound by the Equator Principles.  In short, the text of the 
Equator Principles does not create a mechanism for enforcement of the Principles either 
in the form of self-enforcement by the EPFIs themselves or by a supervisory body.  The 
Principles are, after all, a set of voluntary guidelines and as the Disclaimer section of the 
Principles makes clear, the adoption of the Principles benefits the development of 
individual, internal social and environmental policie s and practices of the EFPI.69  The 
Principles “do not create any rights in, or liability to, any person, public or private.  
Institutions are adopting and implementing these Principles voluntarily and 
independently, without reliance on or recourse to the IFC or the World Bank.”70  
However, as the case of the Orion pulp mill will demonstrate, exposure of an EPFI to 
public scrutiny and shaming can nevertheless be a powerful and effective tool in holding 
corporations to their voluntary commitments.  
V. THE COMPLIANCE COMPLAINT TO THE ORION PULP MILL EPFIS 
¶20 The absence of rights or liabilities does not preclude the ability of individuals and 
groups to hold the signatory financial institutions publicly accountable for their voluntary 
commitments to responsible lending.  An NGO can use the leverage of public ridicule to 
shame a financial institution into complying with its own voluntarily adopted 
commitments.  
¶21 CEDHA sent compliance letters to the ING Group and Calyon in 2006 in an effort 
to hold the EPFIs involved in the financing of Orion accountable to their voluntarily 
adopted commitments.71  Both were early signatories to the Principles and both took pride 
in their commitment to responsible financing.72  Dutch ING committed to the Principles 
on June 23, 2003 and was the eleventh financial institution to do so.73  Moreover, since 
2003, ING has become known as a leading advocate of the Equator Principles.74  Calyon, 
the finance arm of Crédit Agricole, also has publicly taken pride in its voluntary 
commitment.  Calyon claims to be one of the more socially responsible French banks and 
boasts that it was one of the first banks to adhere to the Equator Principles.75  
Nevertheless, these compliance complaint letters achieved mixed results: ING, the first 
EPFI committed to financing the Orion pulp mill withdrew from the project only to have 
                                                                                                                                                 
affected communities.   
68 Id.  
69 Id. at 2.  
70 Id. at 5. 
71 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54; see also Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra note 
20. 
72 The Equator Principles, supra  note 31.  
73 Id.  
74 Bretton Woods Project, Bank Stumped on Uruguayan Paper Mills, June 19, 2006, 
http://brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=538502.  
75 Press Release, CEDHA, CEDHA Press Release May 18th (May 18, 2006), 
http://www.sophieprize.org/Articles/148.html; see also  Press Release, Calyon, Calyon, the leading Equator 
Principles bank in the second half of 2006 (Feb. 2007), at http://www.calyon.com/news/corporate-
investment-bank/league-tables-200720. 
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its spot taken by Calyon, another EPFI, which ultimately financed the construction of the 
project.76 
A. The Compliance Complaint to the ING Group 
¶22 In February 2006, CEDHA addressed a complaint of non-compliance with the 
Equator Principles to the ING, which had been retained in an advisory and coordinating 
role by Metsa-Botnia for the financing of Orion. 77  CEDHA was acting on behalf of 
40,000 stakeholders, including the Environmental Citizen’s Assembly of Gualeguaychu, 
civil society organizations in both Argentina and Uruguay, and the Argentine province of 
Entre Ríos.78  The complaint identified compliance violations of the IFC Environmental 
and Social Policy as well as violations of the Equator Principles themselves.79 
¶23 In its complaint, CEDHA identified violations of Principles 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5.80  
Pertaining to Principle 1, CEDHA claimed deficient “environmental and social 
screening” and supported its assertion with the CAO Preliminary Assessment Report 
which was released as a result of CEDHA’s complaint filed with the CAO in September 
2005.81  Further, CEDHA claimed a violation of Principle 2 based on an inadequate 
Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”) where the borrower had not sufficiently 
addressed cumulative environmental impacts and impacts on local livelihoods of affected 
stakeholders.82  Concerning Principle 3, which determines the applicable social and 
environmental standards and the items the EIA should address,83 CEDHA identified 
numerous deficienc ies of the EIA report, such as inadequate consideration of the hazards, 
pollutants, carcinogens and toxins associated with the operation of the pulp mill.84  With 
respect to Principle 4, which establishes that the borrower will prepare an Environmental 
Management Plan (EMP) drawing on the conclusions of the EIA report,85 CEDHA 
                                                 
76 Press Release, CEDHA, ING Group of Netherlands Pulls Out of Controversial Papermill while World 
Bank Postpones Loans Following Critical Review of Environmental Impact Studies (Apr. 12, 2006),  
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more_information/ing-postpones-loans.php; see also Press Release, CEDHA, 
Papermills: Crédit Agricole of France Steps in for Botnia (May 10, 2006), 
http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/more_information/credit-agricole-botnia.php. 
77 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.  
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.  Principle 1 determines that an EPFI will categorize a 
project based on the magnitude of its potential impacts and risks in accordance with the environmental and 
social screening criteria of the IFC. See The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2. 
82 See Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54.  Principle 2 establishes that for projects assessed 
within Category A or Category B, the borrower must have conducted a Social and Environmental 
Assessment process to address the relevant impacts and risks of the project. See The Equator Principles, 
supra note 13, at 2.  The Equator Principles use a system of social and environmental categorization, based 
on IFC’s environmental and social screening criteria, to reflect the magnitude of impacts understood as a 
result of assessment.  Category A refers to projects with potential significant adverse social or 
environmental impacts that are diverse, irreversible or unprecedented.  Category B refers to projects with 
potential limited adverse social or environmental impacts that are few in number, generally site-specific, 
largely reversible and readily addressed through mitigation measures.  Category C refers to projects with 
minimal or no social or environmental impacts. See The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 6. 
83 The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.  
84 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54. 
85 The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 3.  
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argued that the borrower failed to prepare an EMP.86  Finally, CEDHA claimed a 
violation of Principle 5 based on the absolute lack of consultation between the borrowers 
and the community, particularly Argentine stakeholders.87 
¶24 Following CEDHA’s complaint, ING stunned the project finance world when it 
announced that it would withdraw from the $480 million project.88  ING’s withdrawal 
was particularly stunning because Equator Principles viola tions do not create enforceable 
obligations.  Although submitted following the CEDHA complaint, the withdrawal letter 
stated that the decision “was not based on the assessment of the project’s compliance 
with Equator Principles.”89  ING declined to explain the rationale for the decision on 
grounds of client confidentiality.90  According to Paul de Clerk of the Netherlands branch 
of Friends of the Earth, 91 banks never mention an environmental- related reason for 
stepping out of a project,92 though he believed that the Equator Principles were an 
important reason for ING’s withdrawal from the project.93 
¶25 On April 18, 2006, CEDHA responded with a letter expressing its enthusiasm for 
ING’s decision. 94  It also stated that it understood why ING might have stated that the 
Equator Principles played no role in ING’s decision to withdraw, but that it nevertheless 
“appreciated the energy and effort ING Group has contributed to helping evolve the 
Equator Principles.”95  Despite ING Group’s pronouncements otherwise, the media was 
quick to link ING’s withdrawal to “negative publicity”96 and frequently mentioned ING 
as a leading advocate for the Equator Principles.97  
B. The Compliance Complaint to Calyon 
¶26 Once ING Group withdrew from the Orion Project, Calyon, the private arm of the 
French bank Crédit Agricole, stepped in.98  On May 18, 2006, CEDHA sent a complaint 
letter to Calyon modeled after the letter it had sent to ING. 99  This second complaint not 
only heralded ING Group’s withdrawal from the Orion project as a “critical victory of the 
Equator Principles initiative,” but also went even further in asserting that “any support 
                                                 
86 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54. 
87 Id.  Principle 5 dictates that the borrower should consult “in a structured and culturally appropriate way 
with project affected groups, including indigenous peoples and local NGOs.” The Equator Principles, supra 
note 13, at 3. 
88 Letter from A. Cohen Stuart, ING, to J.D. Taillant, CEDHA, ING’s involvement in Botnia’s pulp mill 
project in Uruguay (Apr. 12, 2006), at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/ing-pullout-
letter-april-12-2006.pdf.   
89 Id.  
90 Oliver Balch, Sustainable Banking: Uruguay Mills Act as Test Case, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 12, 2006.  
91 Friends of the Earth is an environmental NGO founded in 1969 that forms an international network of 
environmental organizations in seventy countries.  Its mission is to protect the rights of all people to live in 
a safe and healthy environment, both at home or in countries around the world. See Friends of the Earth 
International, http://www.foei.org (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  
92 Balch, supra note 90.  
93 Id.  
94 Letter from CEDHA to ING Group, supra note 54. 
95 Id.  
96 “With or without IFC support”, Botnia’s mill goes ahead, MERCOPRESS, June 14, 2006, 
http://www.mercopress.com/vernoticia.do?id=8137&formato=pdf.   
97 Mekay, supra  note 50; see also  Bretton Woods Project, supra note 74.  
98 Mekay, supra note 50.  
99 Letter from CEDHA to Calyon, supra  note 20.  
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from Calyon to Botnia for this investment would imply Calyon’s knowing complicity in 
the many violations cited and a violation of its commitments to uphold the Equa tor 
Principles.”100  The violations cited in the complaint were identical to the ones mentioned 
in the ING complaint letter.101  The letter urged Calyon to “follow in the steps of its 
Equator Bank colleague, ING Group, and cease any and all consideration of financing 
Botnia.”102  
¶27 Also unique to this second complaint was a section entitled “Growing International 
Press Coverage to the Case,” in which CEDHA listed instances of intense media 
coverage and growing media sympathy for the Argentine position as Botnia continued 
construction of its plant and refused to cooperate in the international bilateral negotiations 
processes.103  The letter also provided further insight into why ING Group was explicit in 
mentioning that the Equator Principles were not a critical consideration in their decision 
to withdraw from the Orion project.  The letter states that: 
[w]hile ING Group will not and surely cannot publicly recognize that their 
withdrawal is due to IFC policy violations of the Botnia project, or to the 
Equator Principles Compliance Complaint, as this would surely result in 
potential lawsuits against ING by Botnia, we are clear that the extensive 
evidence provided by the CAO, as well as by independent reviews of the 
EIAs, and by the Equator Principles Compliance Complaint shows beyond 
a doubt that these projects are in direct violations of IFC policy, and as a 
consequence, violate the Equator Principles.104  
¶28 Calyon responded to the CEDHA complaint by saying it would only withdraw if it 
was determined that the Orion project did not comply with IFC Safeguards.105  Calyon 
was referring to the fact that the World Bank and the IFC itself, who also agree to only 
finance projects that comply with IFC Safeguards, were also under investigation for 
compliance based on their interest in financing the Orion project.106  Because the extent 
of Calyon’s voluntary commitment under the Principles was tied to whether or not the 
project complied with IFC Safeguards,107 if the investigation resulted in a finding that the 
World Bank and the IFC could finance the Orion project, Calyon would thus feel free to 
go forward in doing the same.   
                                                 
100 Id. 
101 The violations were of international human rights and environmental law, violations of international 
bilateral law, violations of IFC Environmental and Social Safeguard Policies, violations of IFC Disclosure 
Policy, violations of national and regional laws in Uruguay and Argentina, and finally, violations of the 
Equator Principles. See id.  
102 Id.  
103 Id. Argentina and Uruguay had engaged in diplomatic efforts to reach an amicable solution to 
Argentina’s unwillingness and Uruguay’s willingness to have the Orion paper pulp mill built.  
104 Id. 
105 MERCOPRESS, supra note 96.  
106 Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, Letter of complaint re: IFC Orion Project no. 23817 and Celulosas de 
M’Bopicua, IFC Project no. 23681, available at http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/; 
see also CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 3. 
107 The Equator Principles, supra note 13, at 2.  Principle 3 states that “[f]or projects located in non-OECD 
countries . . . the Assessment will refer to the then applicable IFC Performance Standards and the then 
applicable Industry Specific EHS Guidelines.” Id.  
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VI. THE COMPLIANCE ADVISOR OMBUDSMAN 
¶29 As the conflict surrounding the financing and construction of the Orion project 
developed, the World Bank and the IFC expressed an interest in investing in the Orion 
project.108  In an effort to cease the IFC’s consideration of funding the Orion project and 
to force Calyon to back down, CEDHA needed a finding that the Orion project did not 
comply with the IFC Safeguards.  Such a finding would need to come from the CAO, an 
independent office that reports directly to the President of the World Bank group 
regarding IFC financing of projects.109  A formal complaint to the CAO leads to an 
internal audit evaluating whether the project complies with IFC Safeguards.110  It does not 
intervene in Board or Project processes but has the independence to make 
recommendations that will be helpful in resolving disputes.111  It is also committed to 
addressing external complaints in a fair, objective and constructive manner while 
fostering a higher level of accountability. 112  While reports and recommendations of the 
CAO are public, it is the Office of the President of the World Bank Group that is 
ultimately responsible for their implementation. 113 
¶30 Even before it sent out the compliance complaint letters to ING and Calyon, 
CEDHA filed a detailed complaint with the CAO in September 2005.114  The complaint 
was directed at the World Bank Board, the body that approves IFC financing of projects, 
and was grounded, inter alia, on the violation of IFC policy that would result from 
investment in the Orion project.  Particularly, the complaint addressed non-compliance 
with IFC Operational Policy OP7.50 on Projects on International Waterways115, IFC 
Operational Policy OP 4.01 on Environmental Assessment116 and the IFC Disclosure 
                                                 
108 CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 3.  
109 Id.  
110 CAO, Welcome to Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, at http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/ (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2008).  
111 Press Release, CAO, CAO Urges Parties to Review Cumulative Impact Study on Uruguayan Pulp Mills: 
CAO Internal Audit Continues (Dec. 20, 2005), http://www.cao-
ombudsman.org/pdfs/CAO%20Media%20Advisory%20English%20(12-20-05)1.pdf. 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra  note 106.   
115 Id. at 19.  OP7.50 dictates that there be goodwill between riparian states.  The policy establishes the 
obligation of the borrower to notify the other riparian states of the proposed project, to identify existing 
agreements and their significance concerning the anticipated impacts of the project, and to create a Project 
Appraisal Document dealing with the international aspects of the project. See The World Bank Operational 
Manual, OP 7.50, available at 
http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/institutional/manuals/opmanual.nsf/whatnewvirt/5F511C57E7F3A3DD852
5672C007D07A2?OpenDocument.  The main alleged violation under OP7.50 was the failure of the IFC to 
identify riparian state agreements and their significance with respect to the anticipated environmental 
impacts of the proposed project. See Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra note 106, at 19. 
116 OP 4.01 requires that the IFC review the borrower’s Environmental Impact Assessment and, if adequate, 
disclose them.  The disclosure triggers a sixty-day window of public scrutiny.  Only after the disclosure 
period is concluded can the IFC submit the project to the World Bank Board for approval.  OP 4.01 also 
requires a meaningful and culturally appropriate consultation with the affected parties. See The World Bank 
Operational Manual, supra note 115.  CEDHA alleged the following violations of OP 4.01: (1) that the 
Project did not properly consider its “area of influence,” therefore ignoring aspects of trans-boundary 
environmental contamination on Argentine territory; (2) that the Project disregarded country obligations 
under international law and the Rio Uruguay Treaty with Argentina; (3) that the Project did not 
contemplate feasible alternatives and did not provide an environmental action plan; and (4) that the Project 
did not sufficiently consult with the Argentine communities involved. See Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, 
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Policy. 117  In addition, the CEDHA complaint also identified violations to the IFC 
Disclosure Policy.  CEDHA alleged that the project sponsor and the IFC failed to foster 
real public consultation of stakeholders in Argentine territories; failed to ensure public 
access to information about likely environmental, economic, and social impacts; and 
failed to publish environmental and social information about the project’s impact on the 
locality and on affected stakeholders in Argentina.118 
A. The CAO Preliminary Assessment Report 
¶31 In response to the CEDHA complaint, the CAO released a Preliminary Assessment 
Report in November 2005.119  The CAO Report was the result of a five-day field 
assessment in which the CAO reviewed relevant IFC documentation and visited the 
communities in Gualeguaychu and Fray Bentos.120  The CAO addressed two main 
procedural deficiencies in the processes that resulted in the approval of the financing for 
the Orion Project.  First, the CAO determined that the Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) for the pulp mill did not adequately address the concerns of potentially affected 
local people.121  In particular, the CAO found that the EIA did not provide sufficient 
evidence that concerns related to potential impacts on tourism and agriculture had been 
addressed.122  For instance, the CAO found that there was little evidence presented in the 
EIA that potentially- impacted enterprises or individuals (such as tourism operators and 
fishermen), particularly from Argentina, were consulted.123  The CAO pointed out that the 
EIA also failed to consider broader cumulative impact beyond environmental emissions, 
such as the social and environmental consequences to land-holding and social equity as a 
result of both mills developing large eucalyptus plantations in Uruguay. 124  
¶32 Second, the CAO determined that the IFC failed to conduct a Cumulative Impact 
Study (CIS) and to require a comprehensive assessment of the impact of having two 
paper pulp mills (Orion and the one ENCE sought to build) operating in close proximity 
as part of its review. 125  The Preliminary Assessment outlines the IFC appraisal policy 
that dictates a consultation period, including the creation of a CIS, the preparation of 
EIAs, and other documentation containing relevant information to impacted people.126  
Following this consultation period is the 60-day disclosure period prior to consideration 
by the World Bank Board which decides whether or not the IFC will finance a project.127  
The disclosure period allows for any formal objections to be made before the Board 
decides whether or not to finance a project.128  This means that the disclosure period and 
the consultation period, where the CIS and other documentation are created, should be 
                                                                                                                                                 
supra note 106, at 17-18.  
117 Letter from CEDHA to the CAO, supra note 106, at 17-18.  
118 Id. at 20.  
119 CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26. 
120 Id. at 2.  
121 Id. at 9.  
122 Id.   
123 Id.  
124 Id.  
125 Id. at 7. 
126 Id. at 11. 
127 Id. 
128 Id.  
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kept strictly separate.  The CAO pointed out that while the IFC recognized the need to 
undertake a CIS when it was resolving initial concerns brought up in the early phases of 
consultation, the IFC did so only after the public disclosure of the project documentation 
on the World Bank InfoShop.129  The CAO further concluded that the consultation and 
disclosure processes related to approvals for the Orion project “give[s] the impression of 
being rushed, and presented as a fait accompli to those being consulted.”130  
¶33 The CAO Preliminary Report included four recommendations to the IFC.  First, the 
CAO recommended that the consultation and disclosure periods be kept separate and not 
confused.131  As will be seen shortly, this was easily remediable.  Second, the CAO 
recommended a series of specific “process steps” to be taken in the creation of the CIS.132  
This provided the IFC with a compact guideline of how to satisfy the procedural 
requirements for the creation of the CIS.  The recommendation also included the factual 
matters that should be addressed in the CIS, including, among others, the potential 
impacts of water emissions on water quality, as well as local and tourist fishing 
communities; potential impacts of air emissions on agricultural productivity; potential 
impacts of eucalyptus plantations on landholder equity; and water availability. 133  Third, 
the CAO asked the IFC to clarify the interpretation of OP 4.01 paragraph 3 which refers 
to EIAs taking into account “the country’s overall policy framework and national 
legislation . . . and obligations of the country pertaining to project activities, under 
relevant international environmental treaties and agreements.”134  Fourth, the CAO asked 
for greater clarity in the application of the social and environmental appraisal procedures 
by the IFC.135  The Preliminary Report’s obvious focus was on the procedural aspects 
surrounding the consideration of financing approval for the Orion project.  
¶34 Once the World Bank released the CIS in December 2005, thereby correcting the 
procedural errors highlighted in the November Preliminary Report, the CAO role in the 
dispute effectively came to an end.  On December 20, 2005, the CAO sent letters to all 
parties involved urging them to review the CIS that the World Bank had just released.136  
The CAO informed the parties that the sixty-day consultative phase had been initiated 
and that it would issue a final report of its audit in January. 137  The CAO made clear that 
the purpose of the Final Report was to “identify lessons learned and corrective actions for 
the institution but [would] not be a factor in any decision whether or not the bank invests 
in either of the two pulp mills.”138  Practically, the CEDHA complaint to the CAO 
                                                 
129 Id. at 9.  The World Bank Infoshop is a development bookstore and an information and resource center 
which provides access to information and services to the public.  It is located in Washington, DC and is part 
of the network of the Public Information Centers (PICs) around the world.  Through it, any person can 
access World Bank reports and data, request customized presentations about the Bank’s disclosure policy, 
among others. See The World Bank, About InfoShop, 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/PUBLICATION/INFOSHOP1/0,,contentMDK:20121778
~hlPK:348863~menuPK:323749~pagePK:162350~piPK:165575~theSitePK:225714,00.html (last visited 
Apr. 17, 2008).  
130 CAO, PRELIMINARY REPORT , supra note 26, at 10.  
131 Id. at 11.  
132 Id.  
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id.  
136 Press Release, CAO, supra  note 110.  
137 Id.  
138 Id.  
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resulted in an opportunity for the IFC to correct the procedural errors in its compliance 
with its own Disclosure Policy.  Moreover, as for IFC OP 4.01 on Environmental 
Assessment, the IFC would merely have to clarify the manner in which it applied social 
and environmental appraisal procedures.   
¶35 As outlined in the Final Report released on February 22, 2006, the scope of the 
CAO audit was thus limited to providing greater clarity in relation to the application of 
social and environmental appraisal procedures by the IFC.139  The three main goals of the 
audit were: (1) to review IFC’s due diligence of the Orion project to satisfy itself that the 
EIAs were complete in all material respects prior to disclosure; (2) to review if the actual 
practice of requiring additional information after public disclosure of the EIA is 
consistent with applicable policies; and (3) to understand how the application and 
interpretation of IFC Environmental and Social Review Procedures can result in such 
differing outcomes between the IFC and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency140(“MIGA”).141  In short, this gave the IFC an opportunity to correct procedural 
deficiencies but it did not help CEDHA achieve its goal of stopping the construction of 
the paper pulp mill in Uruguay.  
¶36 Indeed, on October 12, 2006, the IFC released reports concluding that the Orion 
project would not harm the environment in the border region. 142  These reports supported 
the building of both paper pulp mills and were a definitive blow to CEDHA’s efforts to 
interrupt the financing for the construction of the mills.143  Environmental activists from 
Gualeguaychu and Colon, two Argentine cities, reacted with outrage, protests and 
blockaded roads.144  On November 21, 2006, the board of directors of the IFC and MIGA 
approved a $170 million investment by the IFC and a guarantee of up to $350 million 
from MIGA for the Orion project.145  The IFC claimed that this decision came after an 
extensive due diligence process which reached the conclusion that the mill would 
generate significant economic benefits for Uruguay and cause no environmental harm. 146  
Once the IFC concluded that the project conformed to its own environmental and social 
policies, Calyon, the EPFI involved in the project at the time, was assured that it was 
providing financing for a project that fell within the good graces of the Equator 
Principles.  
¶37 CEDHA thus failed to stop the construction of the pulp mill through the CAO.  
While the function of the CAO is to determine whether or not the project complies with 
IFC Safeguards, its reach in this case was merely procedural.  The Final Report focused 
on the procedural timeline of the consultation, disclosure and consideration periods.  
Furthermore, the CAO limited its own scope to providing greater clarity in relation to the 
                                                 
139 CAO, FINAL REPORT , supra note 63.  
140 The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency is a member of the World Bank which promotes foreign 
direct investment in developing countries.  It provides three services: political risk insurance, technical 
assistance to improve investment climates and promote investment opportunities in developing countries, 
and dispute mediation services. See MIGA, About MIGA, 
http://www.miga.org/quickref/index_sv.cfm?stid=1588 (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  
141 Id.  
142 Uruguay/Argentina politics: Pulp plant dispute reignites, EIU VIEWSWIRE Argentina, Oct. 17, 2006. 
143 Id. 
144 Id.  
145 IFC, IFC Latin American & the Caribbean – Orion Pulp Mill - Uruguay, 
http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/lac.nsf/Content/Uruguay_Pulp_Mills (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  
146 Id.  
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application of social and environmental appraisal procedures by the IFC.  Although 
Calyon’s voluntary commitment to finance only projects that abide by the IFC 
Safeguards provided CEDHA with the opportunity to allege in a formal adjudicatory 
venue that the Orion project did not abide by IFC Safeguards, in the end, the CAO 
unfortunately only focused on procedural compliance with the IFC Safeguards.  
VII. EVOLVING PRINCIPLES 
¶38 In July 2006, the Equator Principles were revised so that the World Bank Group 
Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines (“EHS”) replaced the IFC Safeguards as 
the standard by which projects must abide.147  The new Guidelines contain performance 
levels and measures that are normally acceptable to the IFC and are generally considered 
to be achievable in new facilities at reasonable costs while retaining existing 
technology. 148  A new feature contained in the EHS is that the environmental assessment 
may recommend alternative levels or measures which, if acceptable to the IFC, become 
project or site-specific requirements.149  The new standards would require clients to pay 
closer attention to social impacts, to consult affected communities more effectively, and 
to recognize the special rights of indigenous peoples in international law. 150  The new 
standards will probably result in a heightened assessment by the CAO of procedural 
compliance with the EHS.  However, it remains to be seen if these new standards are 
sufficiently rigorous to protect communities from the construction of projects that will 
likely cause social and environmental harm.  
A. Developing the Equator Principles 
¶39 In spite of these new standards and the lowering of the $50 million threshold to $10 
million, there remains a lot to be done for the Equator Principles.  The failure of CEDHA 
to hold Calyon accountable stemmed in large part from the voluntary, non-binding nature 
of the Principles themselves and also from the limited, mainly procedural, reach of the 
CAO in reviewing project compliance with IFC Safeguards.  If the Principles are to result 
in more responsible lending practices, EPFIs should consider higher standards of review, 
perhaps going above and beyond the IFC Safeguards, and an internal mechanism to 
ensure EPFI compliance.  A higher standard of review would require EPFIs and 
corporations to pay even closer attention to the environmental and social impacts of 
future projects.  As higher standards become more acceptable in the finance world, one 
may hope that in the near future controversial projects such as the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline151 and the Sakhalin II oil project152 will not be built without significant 
safeguards for impacted peoples and regions.  
                                                 
147 The Equator Principles, supra  note 13; see also  The Equator Principles, Frequently Asked Questions, 
FAQ n. 4, supra note 32.  
148 Id.  
149 Id.  
150 THE BANKER, supra  note 37.  
151 The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline runs through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.  Like the Orion 
project, the pipeline was built among heated controversy and claims of environmental and human rights 
violations; the main environmental concern was the destruction of viable fishing in the port of Ceyhan in 
Turkey. See Baku-Ceyhan Campaign,Environmental risks in the BTC pipeline, 
http://www.bakuceyhan.org.uk/more_info/impacts.htm (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  Nine EPFIs financed 
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¶40 In assessing what improvements could be made to the Equator Principles, the 2005 
Freshfields survey is instructive.  While the survey pre-dated the revised 2006 Principles, 
many of its recommendations remain pertinent to the future of the Equator Principles.153  
The survey stressed the need for EPFIs to continue their efforts to work together and to 
maintain their open-door policy154 in spite of the danger of attracting signatories that are 
not truly committed to the Principles.155  The survey also called for greater transparency, 
both in terms of disclosure of certain details of projects considered and accepted, and for 
greater communication with NGOs and other stakeholders in the course of each EPFI 
implementation of the Principles.156  The survey also pointed to EPFI dissatisfaction with 
the IFC consultation process and suggested a further round of consultation to be added to 
the process.157  EPFIs would then conduct their own screening process so as to satisfy 
themselves as to the adequacy of all material social and environmental reports produced 
or commissioned by the borrower.158  Since the Principles were first created, EPFIs have 
not shied away from tailoring the Principles to inch closer to their ultimate goal. 159  Since 
the survey appears to allude to a general sense that the Principles should continue to 
extend its influence, it would not be surprising if the EPFIs engaged in another 
reassessment of the reach and scope of the Principles.160  
¶41 There also remains considerable debate focusing on whether voluntary or 
regulatory initiatives are the best method to affect corporate social behavior.161  Certainly, 
the voluntary nature of the Principles contributed to its quick membership expansion and 
popularity. 162  Voluntary principles can also be instrumental in changing corporate social 
behavior by providing a system of norms where legislation is absent and supplementing 
legislation where it is in place.163  Voluntariness, however, only goes so far, and firmer 
steps need to be taken so that the goals of the Principles can be fulfilled.  Calls have also 
been made for the establishment of an independent complaints mechanism that deals with 
alleged violations of the Principles, a development that would impose liability on EPFIs 
                                                                                                                                                 
the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline under the first set of Principles. See THE BANKER, supra  note 42.  
152 The Sakhalin II oil project, currently under construction in Russia, poses a direct threat to the last 
remaining western Pacific grey whales. See THE BANKER, supra  note 42.  
153 Watchman, supra  note 16, at 390-391.  
154 All financial institutions are invited to become EPFIs. See The Equator Principles, Become an Adopting 
Institution, http://www.equator-principles.com/join.shtml (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  
155 Id.  
156 Id.  
157 Watchman, supra note 16, at 395.  The added consultation round would come after the IFC consultation 
process and give another opportunity for review of the impacts of proposed projects so that the EPFI could 
be assured that the project reflects the ideals of sustainable and responsible development.  
158 Id. at 392.  
159 Between March and May of 2006, the EPFIs engaged in a substantive revision of the Principles which 
led to the revised July 2006 Principles. See Press Release, The Equator Principles, Update: EPFI Review of 
Equator Principles (June 8, 2006), http://www.equator-principles.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 
2008).  In May 2007, EPFIs met again to discuss more specific aspects of the Principles. Press Release, The 
Equator Principles, EPFIs Meet After Nearly One Year of EPII Implementation (May 12-14, 2007), 
http://www.equator-principles.com/index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008).  In December 2007, EPFIs met 
again to discuss ongoing developments of the Principles, in particular governance, transparency, and 
grievance mechanisms at the project level. Press Release, The Equator Principles, EPFI Meetings (Dec. 3-
5, 2007), http://www.equator-principles.com/ index.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2008). 
160 Watchman, supra  note 16, at 392.  
161 Paul Watchman, Banks, Business and Human Rights, A.L.I. 396, 397 (2006). 
162 Watchman, supra  note 14.  
163 Watchman, supra note 161, at 397.  
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and fundamentally change the non-binding nature of the Principles.164  One should expect 
that such a critical change would not occur without protest from EPFIs and possible 
withdrawal from unwilling EPFIs from the Principles altogether.  
¶42 Nevertheless, if EPFIs are truly committed to sustainable development and 
responsible lending practices, they must take steps to keep the Equator Principles current, 
effective and relevant.  Such efforts would result in the continued development of the 
Principles and would be instrumental in continuing to set standards for the finance 
industry.  
VIII. BEYOND THE EQUATOR PRINCIPLES 
¶43 While the Equator Principles continue to evolve and the area of voluntary 
principles and guidelines seeks firmer ground within the area of corporate human rights 
responsibility, individuals, NGOs and states should go beyond the Principles and 
continue to rely on the more traditional modes of enforcing treaties, agreements, 
international human rights and environmental laws.  Such modes of enforcement also 
played a part in trying to stop the construction of the paper pulp mill in Uruguay.  For 
instance, CEDHA filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights (“Commission”) against the World Bank in September 2005.165  The complaint 
denounced the World Bank’s proposed financing of the Orion project and directly 
implicated a World Bank-financed development project for the first time.166  It was an 
unprecedented reach to a human rights tribunal to force non-state actor compliance.167  To 
this date, however, the Commission has not reached a decision on the complaint.  If this 
attempt at expanding the court’s jurisdiction is successful, it will pave the way for future 
accountability of non-state actors. 
¶44 Also, in May 2006, Argentina instituted proceedings against Uruguay in the 
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) for violating the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay 
which determined rights to the use of natural resources along the River Uruguay. 168  In 
July 2006, the ICJ denied, without prejudice on the merits, the Argentine request of an 
injunctive order to Uruguay to suspend construction. 169  The court found that Argentina 
failed to meet the burden of imminent threat of irreparable damage and denied the 
demand for an injunction. 170  The ICJ decision on whether Uruguay is violating the 
Treaty is not expected until later in 2008,171 well after the plant begins its operations.  
Arguably, the ICJ mechanism could be more effective than any NGO campaign to force 
non-state actors to comply with voluntary commitments, or any recourse to a formal 
                                                 
164 Balch, supra  note 90. 
165 Jorge Daniel Taillant, Using human rights tribunal to force Bank compliance: Uruguayan paper mill, 
Jan. 23, 2006, http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/art-507742.   
166 Id.  
167 Id.  
168 Lee, supra note 11, at 71. 
169 Id.  
170 Id. 
171 The ICJ’s last published Order on the case fixed time -limits for the filings of Argentina’s Reply for 
January 29, 2008 and for the Uruguayan Rejoinder for July 29, 2008. See Press release, ICJ, The Court 
authorizes the submission of a Reply by Argentina and a Rejoinder by Uruguay and fixes time -limits for 
the filing of these pleadings (Sept. 17, 2007), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/135/14037.pdf. 
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adjudicatory venue such as the CAO.  ICJ jurisdiction for contentious issues, however, 
exists only for state members of the United Nations 172 on the basis of state consent over 
“matters specifically provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and 
conventions in force.”173  This necessarily excludes individuals and NGOs from reaching 
the ICJ unless a member state espouses a claim on their behalf.  Furthermore, while an 
ICJ decision finding a violation of the Treaty could result in anything from a formal 
reprimand to fines and sanctions, or even the dismantling of the mill, in many instances, 
such reparation would come only after considerable delay and damage to the environment 
and surrounding areas has already been done.  
IX.  CONCLUSION 
¶45 CEDHA was unable to stop the construction of a foreign-owned paper pulp mill to 
prevent environmental and social damage to the communities of fishermen and tourist 
industry of the Entre Ríos area.  Unfortunately, the Equator Principles did not have 
enough bite to compel Calyon’s compliance with its voluntary commitment.  However, 
for the project finance world, CEDHA’s efforts did not go unnoticed.  CEDHA’s efforts 
were instrumental in guaranteeing procedural compliance with IFC Safeguards, in 
demanding clarification of IFC Operational Policies regarding Environmental 
Assessment, in showing the world that EPFIs need to consolidate their approach to the 
Principles, and in revealing that one can rely on the Principles to expose EPFIs to public 
shaming in an effort to compel compliance with their commitment.  CEDHA’s efforts 
demonstrated that an NGO should not shy away from trying to hold a non-state actor 
accountable to voluntary, non-binding commitments.  ING’s withdrawal from the Orion 
project suggests that some EPFIs do care about public opinion and will take such non-
binding commitments seriously.  Voluntary commitments can be instrumental for NGOs 
as leverage to reach desired goals and to prompt change, without having to resort to state 
intervention, international human rights courts and other more formal, costly and time-
consuming adjudicatory venues. 
                                                 
172 U.N. CHARTER art. 93, ¶ 1. 
173 Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 1.  
